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ing <>t' fad. «'oin'lu.-:ioii> nf iav and judgment {minting: 
plaintiffs-respondents mnndntnn injunctive enforce-
ment of tin- coviuuii. 
Case 
No. 13821 
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BELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiffs-respondents seek the affirmance of the 
judgment of the lower court granting mandatory injunc-
tive enforcement of the covenant. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The statement of facts by defendants-appellants 
(hereinafter for convenience referred to as " defend-
ants") at pages 2-5 of their appellate brief is in cer-
tan respects inconsistent with the facts as developed in 
the court below and fails to refer to certain material 
facts. Consequently, plaintiffs-respondents (hereinafter 
for convenience referred to as "plaintiffs")? make the 
following statement of facts. 
On March 24, 1954, A. R. Curtis & Sons Company 
and the plaintiffs each owned certain parcels of real 
property located in the Union Heights Subdivision of 
Salt Lake County, Utah. On this same date A. R. Cur-
tis & Sons Company and the plaintiffs, were jointly de-
veloping a shopping center on their respective parcels 
in the Union Heights Subdivision. Consequently, A. R. 
Curtis & Sons Company and the plaintiffs desired to des-
ignate and set aside certain portions of this real proper-
ty to be used for automobile parking. They sought to 
accomplish this by entering into an agreement on March 
24, 1954 which designated and set aside certain portions 
of their respective properties to be used for automobile 
parking. Included in the parcels so designated and set 
aside was the property which is the subject matter of 
this litigation, ie., the East 50 feet of the South 152.5 
2 
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feet of Block 6, Union Heights Subdivision. This agree-
ment was recorded on April 27, 1954 and characterized 
all of the pertinent provisions therein as covenants run-
ning with the described properties. (Exhibit 1-P; Find-
ings of Fact Nos. 1-5, E. 200, 325-26.) 
In March 1969, defendant Sugarhouse Shopping 
Center Associates acquired the assets of A. R. Curtis 
& Sons Company including the property in the Union 
Heights Subdivision. Defendant Sugarhouse Shopping 
Center Associates at all times pertinent herein was a 
limited partnership and defendants Spence Clark and 
James A. Collier were general partners. (Findings of 
Fact Nos. 6-7, R. 326.) 
On October 14, 1969 this partnership and its gen-
eral partners Clark and Collier leased a parcel of land 
152.5 ft. x 132.5 ft. in Block 6 of the Union Heights Subdi-
vision to defendant American Oil Company. (Exhibit 
2-P; Findings of Fact No. 8, R. 326.) The leased prem-
ises included the 50 ft. x 152.5 ft. parcel in question 
which was specifically subject to the covenants for auto-
mobile parking in the March 1954 agreement between 
plaintiffs and defendant Sugarhouse Shopping Center 
Associates' predecessor in interest, A. R. Curtis & Sons 
Company. (Exhibit 1-P and 2-P; Findings of Fact No. 
9, R. 326-27.) The October 14, 1969 lease was subse-
quently recorded. (Exhibit 2-P) 
On the same day the lease was executed, defendant 
American Oil and the defendant partnership also exe-
cuted a lease rider. This lease rider expressly ac-
knowledged the existence of the covenant running with 
3 
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the land in question and the agreement between plain-
tiffs and defendant Sugarhouse Shopping Center As-
sociates' predecessor in interest which created the cov-
enant. Furthermore, this lease rider recognized that 
defendant American Oil's contemplated use of the leased 
premises might violate the covenant and agreement cre-
ating it. The lease rider between defendants Sugar-
house Shopping Center Associates and American Oil al-
so expressly contemplated the very remedy which the 
lower court granted: the abandonment or relocation of 
improvements made on the property by American Oil 
resulting from the enforcement of the March 24, 1954 
agreement and covenants therein. The lease rider then 
provided for a ratable reduction of rent in the event 
enforcement of the covenant did not render the opera-
tion of a service station impossible. (Exhibit 3-P; Find-
ings of Fact No. 10, E. 327.) The lease rider, however, 
unlike the lease itself, was never recorded. (Exhibit 3-P) 
The trial exhibits and testimony demonstrate and 
the trial court found that all of the defendants on Oc-
tober 14, 1969, the date of the lease and lease rider, knew 
a portion of the propery leased was covered by the 
covenant, that the defendants knew the use of the leased 
premises contemplated by defendant American Oil Com-
pany might probably violate the covenant and that the 
defendants knew such a violation might result in the 
necessity to relocate or remove improvements made on 
the leased premises,, (Tr. 87-88, 99-100; Exhibit 3-P; 
Findings of Fact Nos. 11, 12 and 13, R. 200, 327-28.) 
The testimony at trial demonstrated that defendants 
Sugarhouse Shopping Center Associates, Spence Clark, 
4 
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James Collier and American Oil did not inform the plain-
tiffs of the lease, lease rider or American OiPs contem-
plated use of the leased premises. (Tr. 88, 99, 107; 
Findings of Fact No. 14, R. 328.) Two months after 
the execution of the lease and lease rider, defendant 
American Oil approved the construction of the improve-
ments on the leased premises. (Tr. 80) 
The record does not clearly establish the date on 
which construction of the American Oil improvements 
commenced. Prior to the commencement of construction 
in approximately February or March of 1970, a 3 ft. x 
5 ft. or 4 ft. x 6 ft. sign announcing the proposed con-
struction of an American Oil service station was placed 
somewhere on the leased premises. (Tr. 91, 93; Find-
ings of Fact No. 22, R. 201.) 
Plaintiff Nick Papanikolas first observed the con-
struction of the service station in August 1970 when 
the prefabricated service station was being placed on 
the property. (Tr. 107; Findings of Fact No. 15, R. 
328.) Plaintiffs immediately complained to defendants 
and protested the violation of the covenant. (Tr. 107-
108; Findings of Fact No. 16, R. 328-29.) Plaintiff Nick 
Papanikolas' observation of the construction in August 
1970 was the first notice which the plaintiffs had of any 
use of the property by American Oil or of any viola-
tion of the restrictive covenant. (Tr. 107-108; Findings 
of Fact No. 15, R. 328.) The construction of the ser-
vice station consumed approximately 90 to 120 days and 
was completed in August, 1970. (Findings of Fact Nos. 
14, 23, R. 201, 328.) 
5 
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Immediately following plaintiff Nick Papanikolas' 
protest, there occurred an exchange of correspondence 
between plaintiff's counsel, defendant Sugarhouse 
Shopping Center Associates and said defendants' coun-
sel wherein plaintiffs' counsel alleged and protested the 
violation of the covenant and the latter denied the same. 
(Tr. 50-51; Exhibits 5-P, 6-P and 7-P; Findings of Fact 
No. 17, R. 329.) The defendants refused to comply with 
plaintiffs' demands that the improvements violative of 
the covenant be removed but did periodically negotiate 
the sale of plaintiffs' property in connection with the 
alleged violation of the covenant. (Tr. 52, 114; Find-
ings of Fact No. 18, R. 329.) When it became obvious 
to plaintiffs that these negotiations would not be further 
productive or fruitful, plaintiffs filed their complaint 
and thereby initiated the case at bar. (Tr. 52.) Defend-
ants Sugarhouse Shopping Center, Spence Clark and 
James Collier counter-claimed alleging that plaintiffs 
themselves had violated the 1954 agreement between 
plaintiffs and said defendants' predecessor in interest, 
A. R. Curtis & Sons Company. (Answer to Plaintiffs' 
Amended Complaint, R. 125; More Definitely Stated 
Counterclaim, R. 156.) 
With respect to the status of the Sugarhouse 
Shopping Center at the time of trial, the trial court found 
that the character of the. shopping center was substanti-
ally the same as it was on March 24, 1954, the date on 
which plaintiffs and defendants' predecessor in interest 
agreed to preserve for parking a portion of the property 
now leased to American Oil. (Findings of Fact No. 21, 
R. 201.) With respect to the availability of parking and 
6 
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the need for additional parking, the following evidence 
is particularly pertinent. Plaintiffs own various parcels 
in the Sugarhouse Shopping Center, including unim-
proved property in close proximity to the American Oil 
service station. (Tr. 72.) Plaintiffs also own several 
residential properties directly south of the shopping 
center which they plan to develop as shopping center 
property. (Tr. 104-106.) Certain property in close 
proximity to the service station, while available for 
parking, is of no particular value to the shopping cen-
ter for parking because of the adverse contour of the 
land. (Tr. 109.) There was also evidence that certain 
parking areas north of the shopping center may not be 
available for parking in the future because an interven-
ing easement owner is contesting access across its ease-
ment to the shopping center (Tr. 101-104.) 
The trial court found that certain improvements 
had been made by American Oil on the land covered by 
the covenant. These improvements included paving, 
curbing, landscaping, service station sign, gasoline pump 
islands, canopies, catch basin, phone booth and light 
pole. The court found that these improvements rendered 
the property unsuitable and unuseable as a parking lot. 
(Findings of Fact Nos. 19, 20, R, 330.) 
I. ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE GRANTING OF THE INJUNCTION 
WAS PROPER. 
Under the circumstances of this case the trial 
court's mandatory injunctive enforcement of the cove-
7 
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nant was proper. The following factors extant in the 
case at bar, both individually and in the aggregate, dem-
onstrate the propriety of the trial court's judgment: (a) 
the defendants' actual knowledge of the covenant, the 
probable violation thereof, and the legal consequences 
of such violation, all of which antedated the lease to 
American Oil and the construction of the improvements 
violative of the covenant; (b) the absence of evidence 
of injury to defendants; (c) the continuing and prospec-
tive need for enforcement of the covenant; (d) and the 
reasonableness and unequivocal language of the cove-
nant. 
A. The "Balance of Injury" Test is Inapplicable 
When the Defendant has Actual Knowledge 
of the Covenant and its Probable Violation. 
The central issue in this appeal is the applicability 
of the equitable principle under which courts balance 
the comparative injury to the parties. The defendants 
label this principle the "balance of injury" or "balance 
of convenience" test and, at pages 6-17 of their brief, 
argue that the applicability of this principle to the facts 
and circumstances in the instant case requires the re-
versal of the lower court's mandatory injunction. Plain-
tiffs concede the existence and wisdom of the "balance 
of injury" test but submit that this test is inapplicable 
to this case because defendants' violation of the cove-
nant was calculated, willful and intentional. 
Prior to the commencement of construction of the 
improvements in question, defendants entered into a 
lease of the premises,, (Exhibit 2-P.) On the same day 
8 
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that the lease was executed, the defendants executed a 
rider to the lease. This lease rider expressly and un-
equivocally acknowledged the existence of the cove-
nant for parking. Additionally, the lease rider ac-
knowledged that defendant American Oil's use of the 
premises might violate the covenant and that American 
Oil could thereby be required by legal processes to re-
move and relocate its service station and other improve-
ments. (Exhibit 3-P.) Thus, the defendant Sugarhouse 
Shopping Center Associates, the lessor, acting through 
its general partners, defendants Collier and Clark, and 
defendant American Oil, the lessee, knew that the ser-
vice station would violate the covenant iot parking pri-
or to the time construction was even commenced. The 
defendants admitted this under oath. (Tr. 87-88, 99-100.) 
They also recognized that a court of equity could enforce 
the covenant by mandatory injunction and require that 
the service station be removed from the property. 
Defendants then compounded their inequitable con-
duct. They saw fit to record the lease agreement but 
sought to hide their state of mind and knowledge of the 
covenant by not recording the lease rider. (Exhibits 2-P 
and 3-P.) Moreover, in spite of their knowledge of the 
covenant, the probable violation of the covenant and the 
legal consequences of such violation, the defendants 
made no attempt to notify the plaintiffs of either the 
lease or the contemplated use of the leased premises by 
American Oil. (Tr. 87-88, 99-100, 107.) Defendant 
American Oil then proceeded to construct the service 
station in violation of the covenant. The lower court 
recognized these facts and accordingly found that prior 
9 
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to construction the defendants knew of the covenant; 
that they realized the contemplated use of the property 
by American Oil would probably violate the covenant; 
that they recognized such violation might result in the 
requirement to remove the service station from the prop-
erty; and that defendants did not inform the plaintiffs 
of either the lease or thei contemplated use of the leased 
premises. (Findings of Fact Nos. 11, 12, 13 and 14, R. 
200, 327-328.) These findings were based on the only 
evidence which was probative of defendants' state of 
mind. They are consequently supported by sufficient 
evidence and will not be disturbed on appeal. McCul-
lough v. Wasserbaek, 30 Utah 2d 398, 518 P. 2d 691 
(1974); Mayer v. Flynn, 46 Utah 598, 150 P. 962, 964 
(1915). 
Given these facts, the "balance of injury" test is 
inapplicable. This equitable principle is not applicable 
in situations where the defendant knowingly violates a 
covenant running with the land or knowingly encroaches 
on the property of another. In such circumstances where 
the encroachment or violation of the covenant is willful 
and done in bad faith, the courts will grant mandatory 
injunctive relief. The Supreme Court of Utah recog-
nized this very principle in Mary Jane Stevens Co. v. 
First National Building Co., 89 Utah 456, 57 P. 2d 1099 
(1936). The Court in denying the injunction stated: 
We do not mean to hold that in certain cases a 
party might not be compelled to remove subsur-
face encroachments into the land of another, 
where they were knowingly made without regard 
to the other's rights and purely for the benefit 
10 
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of the party encroaching, and where it could be 
shown that they were a detriment to the use of 
the other's land and there was no laches or delay 
in asking for the remedy. Every case must stand 
on its own facts. 57 P. 2d at 1125 (emphasis 
added). 
In Lewis v. Pingree National Bank, 47 Utah 35, 151 
P. 558 (1915) the Utah Court recognized the propriety of 
mandatory injunctive relief in encroachment cases. The 
Court denied an injunction to remove structures en-
croaching on public property but granted a mandatory 
injunction to remove structures encroaching on plain-
tiff's private property. The Court reversed that portion 
of the injunction requiring defendant to correct the pub-
lic encroachment only because of plaintiff's failure to 
promptly bring suit after discovering the nuisance. 151 
P. at 563. The Court, however, upheld that portion of the 
trial court's mandatory injunction requiring defendant to 
remove portions of the building encroaching on plaintiff's 
own property and specifically stated that plaintiff could 
not be limited to a mere action for damages. 151 P. at 
565. 
The Utah Court has never been called upon to ap-
ply the above principles set forth in Mary Jane Stevens 
and Pingree National Bank in a case where the defend-
ant has knowingly, willfully and maliciously encroached 
on another's property or violated a covenant. Other 
courts, however, have been faced with such circum-
stances and have granted the mandatory injunctive re-
lief requested. The revelant cases wherein mandatory 
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injunctive relief was granted fall into two categories: 
(1) encroachment cases; and (2) covenant cases. 
In Stewart v. Finkelstone, 206 Mass. 28, 92 N.E. 37 
(1910) the defendant knowingly and intentionally vio-
lated certain covenants restricting the character and lo-
cation of buildings. The court expressly rejected the 
"balance of injury" test and affirmed the mandatory in-
junction of the court below. The court reasoned that 
such relief should not be withheld merely because of the 
disproportionate pecuniary loss to the defendant caused 
by the decree. In this regard the court stated: 
It has been found that the defendant with full 
knowledge of the restrictions "deliberately at-
- tempted" to override them, and thus deprive the 
district of the character given it by the restric-
tions. He took his chances as to the effect of his 
conduct with eyes open to the results which might 
ensue. It has been the practice) of courts to issue 
' mandatory injunctions upon similar facts. [Ci-
tations omitted.] Intrenchment behind consider-
able expenditures of money cannot shield pre-
mediated efforts to evade or circumvent legal 
obligations from the salutary remedies of equity. 
92 N.E. at 40 (emphasis added). 
In Hartman v. Wells, 257 111. 167,100 N.E. 500 (1912) the 
court reversed the ruling below and granted a manda-
tory injunction requiring defendant to remove the struc-
tures which violated a building line covenant entered in-
to by plaintiff and defendants' predecessors in interest. 
Defendants were charged with knowledge of the cov-
enant and under such circumstances the court held that 
the resultant injury to the plaintiff, if any, was immate-
12 
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rial. 100 N.E. at 502. Numerous other decisions have 
specifically rejected the "balance of injury" test and 
have granted mandatory injunctive relief when the de-
fendant knowingly violated a restrictive covenant run-
ning with the land. E.g., Williamson v. Needles, 191 
Okla. 560, 133 P. 2d 211 (1942); Attorney General v. 
Algonquin Club, 153 Mass. 447, 27 N.E. 2 (1891); Mor-
gan v. Veach, 59 Cal. App. 2d 682, 139 P. 976, 980-83 
(1943); Title Insurance & Trust Co. v. Ritckardson, 91 
Cal. App. 606, 266 P. 570 (1928). 
The second category of cases involving mandatory 
injunctions are those where structures or buildings en-
croach upon the property of another. As in the cases 
involving covenants the courts grant mandatory injunc-
tive relief requiring the removal of the encroaching 
structure and do not apply the "balance of in jury" test 
when the defendant has knowingly and willfully disre-
garded the property rights of the aggrieved party. E.g., 
Pradelt v. Lewis, 297 111. 374, 130 N.E. 785 (1921); City 
of Dunsmuir v. Silva, 154 Cal. App. 2d 285, 317 P.2d 653 
(1957); Agmar v. Solonian, 87 Cal. App. 127, 261 P. 
1029, 1035 (1927); AtmtiUia Protective Association v. 
Wolfsokn, 244 111. App. 71 (1927). 
In reversing the lower court's refusal to grant a 
mandatory injunction, the court in Christensen v. Tucker, 
144 Cal. App. 2d 554, 250 P.2d 660 (1952) delineated 
guidelines to be followed at a new trial upon remand. 
The court held that a condition to denial of such in-
junctive relief was a finding that defendant's encroach-
ment was innocent and not willful. 250 P.2d at 665. In 
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a subsequent case the Supreme Court of California sim-
ilarly resolved an encroachment dispute. Brown Derby 
Bollywood Corp. v. Hatton, 40 CaL Bptr. 848, 395 P.2d 
896 (1964). The court characterized the crucial issue in 
this manner: " [DJid defendant Hatton act in good faith 
or did he act in willful disregard of plaintiff's rights hop-
ing that a court would allow the structure to remain and 
grant only a remedy of damages?" 395 P.2d at 899. The 
Court in Arnold v. Melani, 75 Wash. 2d 143, 449 P.2d 800 
(1968) required the defendant in an encroachment case 
to establish by clear and convincinug evidence that he 
"did not simply take a calculated risk, act in bad faith or 
negligently, wilfully or indifferently locate the encroach-
ing structure." 449 P.2d at 805-806. Thus, in determin-
ing the propriety of mandatory injunctive relief, the 
courts closely scrutinize the intent and state of mind 
of the encroaching party and, if the encroachment is 
found to be intentional, do not apply the "balance of 
injury" test. E.g. Id.; Golden Press, Inc. v. Rylands, 
124 Colo. 122, 235 P.2d 592, 595 (1951). 
The same authorities upon which the defendants 
in the instant case rely support the proposition that the 
"balance of injury" test is inapplicable when a cove-
nant running with the land is knowingly and willfully vi-
olated. At page 15 of their brief defedants cite Paci-
fic Gas & Electric Co. v. Minnette, 246 P.2d 1025 (CaL 
App. 1952) as authority for the "balance of injury" test. 
This case, however, was subsequently reversed upon re-
hearing. The rehearing was granted in order to address 
the propriety of weighing the relative hardships under 
the circumstances. Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. Min-
14 
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nette, 115 Cal. App, 2d 698, 252 P. 2d 642, 64748 (1953). 
The court reversed its prior ruling and upheld the low-
er court's injunction requiring the removal of the build-
ing. In doing so the court charged the defendant with 
knowledge of the building restriction and emphasized 
that his wrongdoing was not an innocent mistake. 252 P. 
2d at 648. 
The secondary authorities upon which defendants 
rely at page 15 of their brief also support! the proposi-
tion that the "balance of injury" test is inapplicable 
when the defendant knowingly and willfully encroaches 
or violates a covenant running with the land. Defend-
ants rely on the annotation appearing at 28 A.L.R. 2d 
679, 690 in support of the "balance of injury" test. A 
subsequent section of the same annotation states the 
general rule when the encroachment is intentional and 
willful: 
Where an encroachment by an adjoining land-
owner is intentional or willful, a mandatory in-
junction will ordinarily be granted to compel its 
removal, ivithotit regard for the relative conven-
iences or hardships which may result from order-
ing its removal. Annotation 28 A.L.R. 2d 679, 705 
(1953) (emphasis added). 
Defendants also rely on 42 Am. Jur. 2d, Injunctions §§ 
57-60 (1969). However, in Section 58 of this article, it 
is stated: 
But relief by way of a mandatory injunction will 
not be denied on the ground that the loss caused 
by it will be disproportionate to the good accom-
plished, where it appears that the defendant 
acted with a full knowledge of the complainant's 
15 
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rights and with an understanding of the conse-
quences which might ensue, or that he has will-
fully invaded another's rights in real property. 
42 Am. Jr. 2d at pp. 801-802. 
The documents and testimony in the instant case 
establish and the lower court found that, prior to the 
construction of the service station, the defendants had 
actual knowledge of the covenant; that the defendants 
knew the use of the property contemplated by defendant 
American Oil would probably violate the covenant; that 
the defendants knew such a violation might result in 
the necessity to relocate or remove the service station 
which they proposed to build. (Tr. 87-88, 99-100; Ex-
hibit 3-P; Findings of Fact Nos. 11, 12 and 13, E, 200, 
327-28.) Notwithstanding this actual knowledge and 
realization of the consequences of their contemplated 
acts, defendants undertook the construction of the ser-
vice station without even attempting to notify the plain-
tiffs. Such conduct constituted a ruthless, willful and 
intentional violation of the covenant for parking. Un-
der such facts and circumstances it is ludicrous for de-
fendants to claim that the equitable "balance of injury" 
test, which is applicable only to innocent and unknowing 
conduct, should now relieve them from alleged hardships 
caused by the lower court's mandatory injunction. 
While none of the Utah cases relied upon by defend-
ants involved such obdurate and ruthless conduct, this 
Court has suggested in dictum that mandatory injunc-
tive relief is proper when an encroachment or violation 
of a covenant is "knowingly" accomplished "without re-
gard to the other's rights and purely for the benefit of 
16 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
the party encroaching." Mary Jane Stevens Co. v. First 
National Building Co., 89 Utah 456, 57 P. 2d 1099, 1125 
(1936). See Lewis v. Pingree National Bank, 47 Utah 
35,151 P. 558, 563 (1915). The Court must now not only 
decide the case at bar but also must establish a prece-
dent in this jurisdiction which will guide the future con-
duct of the citizens of the state. Plaintiffs submit that 
defendants' conduct in this case compels a ruling, in ac-
cordance with the authorities discussed above, that the 
"balance of injury" test is inapplicable under the cir-
cumstances. Any other ruling would be a dangerous 
precedent which would for all practical purposes ren-
der all legitimate covenants running with the land void 
ab initio, undermine the sanctity of contract and permit 
any person to take the law into his own hands when an-
other person's property rights conflict with his own de-
sires, whims and caprice. 
B. Assuming the Applicability of the "Balance 
of Injury" Test, the Injury to Plaintiffs from 
Defendants' Violation of the Covenant is at 
Least as Significant as the Injury to Defend-
ants Resulting from the Mandatory Injunction. 
Assuming the instant case did not involve a calcu-
lated, intentional and malicious violation of a covenant 
and that the "balance of injury" test might therefore be 
applicable, the facts and circumstances still present a 
situation appropriate for mandatory injunctive relief. 
The injury to plaintiffs' interests resulting from defend-
ants' violation of the covenant is at least as significant 
and substantial as any alleged resultant hardship to de-
fendants from the mandatory injunction. 
17 
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The plaintiffs presently are owners of properties 
in the Sugarhouse Shopping Center, including unim-
proved property in close proximity to the American 
Oil service station. (Tr. 72.) Such ownership was suf-
ficiently significant in 1954 for the plaintiffs to enter 
into mutual covenants for parking with defendant Sugar-
house Shopping Center Associates' predecessor in in-
terest. Plaintiffs thereby defined a significant interest 
to be protected and agreed with the other parties to the 
covenant that the use of the subject property for any-
thing other than parking would represent a substantial 
injury to plaintiffs. Hartman v. Wells, 257 111. 167, 100 
N.E. 500, 502 (1912); Morgan v. Veachf 59 Cal. App. 2d 
682, 139 P. 2d 976, 981 (1943). Consequently, the opin-
ion of any number of people, including defendants' coun-
sel, that the breach of the covenant did not cause any 
substantial injury to plaintiffs cannot defeat the cove-
nant and preclude plaintiffs' enforcement of it. Hart-
man v. Wells, supra.; Morgan v. Veach, supra. The same 
needs and interests which compelled plaintiffs to enter 
into this covenant for parking in 1954 still exist today. 
The trial court recognized this when, after viewing all 
of the evidence, it found that at the time of trial the 
character of the shopping center was substantially the 
same as it was in 1954. (Findings of Fact No. 21, K. 
201.) Thus, the same significant interests which plain-
tiffs sought to protect by the 1954 covenant are now be-
ing disregarded and substantially injured by defendants' 
continuing breach of the covenant. 
The evidence at trial showed that plaintiffs dem-
onstrated remarkable prescience by entering into the 
18 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
covenant for parking in 1954. The testimony established 
that plaintiffs now own several residential properties 
directly south of the shopping center which they plan 
to develop as shopping center property. (Tr. 104-106.) 
Such development will put a strain on presently avail-
able parking and require additional parking. There was 
also testimony that areas north of the shopping center, 
which are presently used for parking, may not be avail-
able for parking in the future because the owner of the 
intervening easement was contesting access across its 
easement to the shopping center. (Tr. 101-104.) Addi-
tionally, certain property in close proximity to the ser-
vice station, which defendants contend is available for 
parking, is of no particular value for parking because 
of the adverse contour of the land. (Tr. 109.) Thus, 
plaintiffs' concern for adequate parking, which com-
pelled them to enter into the contract creating the sub-
ject covenant, is still a legitimate concern. Plaintiffs 
are, therefore, suffering irreparable damage as a result 
of defendant American Oil's use of the subject property 
which renders it unsuitable and unuseable as a parking 
lot. (Findings of Fact No. 20, R. 330.) 
Defendants contend at page 6 of their brief that 
there has "never been a shortage of parking spaces nor 
a need for additional parking area." Defendants rely 
on page 74 of the trial transcript for this contention. A 
review of page 74 of the transcript, however, reveals 
that there is no evidentiary basis for this contention. 
Moreover, defendant Sugarhouse Shopping Center As-
sociates and its general partners filed a counterclaim 
against the plaintiffs alleging that the plaintiffs them-
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selves had violated the covenants for parking. In sup-
port of this counterclaim these defendants alleged that 
they had made numerous demands on plaintiffs to con-
struct additional parking facilities on plaintiffs' proper-
ty and that plaintiffs' failure to comply with these de-
mands constituted a violation of the covenants. (Answer 
to Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint, R. 125; More Defi-
nitely Stated Counterclaim, R, 156.) Consequently, de-
fendants should not now be allowed to contend without 
an evidentiary basis that there has never been a short-
age of parking nor a need for additional parking. Ad-
ditionally, the defendants' contention that no one had 
ever demanded more parking is directly contradicted by 
their own pleadings wherein they allege numerous de-
mands upon plaintiffs to construct additional parking. 
While plaintiffs' injury resulting from defendants' 
violation of the covenant was significant and substan-
tial, plaintiffs were unable to measure their injury with 
a dollar figure and as a result did not prove specific 
monetary damage at trial. Specific monetary damage, 
however, need not be established to support an action 
for injunctive relief. Bristol-Myers Co. v. Picker, 302 
N.Y. 61, 96 N.E. 2d 177, 22 ALE 2d 1203, 1209 (1950); 
Berstein v. Friedman, 62 Wyo. 16, 160 P. 2d 227, 234 
(1945). Damages which are not susceptible to measure-
ment in dollars are characterized as irreparable dam-
ages since the concept of irreparable damages has ref-
erence to the difficulty of measuring the amount of dam-
ages. E.g., Hiner v. Independent School District No. 50, 
380 P. 2d 943, 946 (Okla. 1963); Crouch v. Central La-
bor Cotmcil of Portland, 134 Ore. 612, 293 P. 729, 732 
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(1930); Pradelt v. Lewis, 297 111. 374, 130 N.E, 785, 14 
ALE 828, 831 (1921). Plaintiffs' damages, then, being 
of a nature not susceptible to measurement, or at least 
difficult to measure, are irreparable. Consequently, 
plaintiff was entitled to the equitable relief granted by 
the trial court. 
Under the "balance of injury" test it is of course 
necessary to look at the quantum of injury to a defend-
ant resulting from the injunction. In this regard, the 
defendants in the instant case have put all their eggs in 
one basket and rely entirely on the testimony of one 
witness who stated that the American Oil service sta-
tion would be rendered valueless if access to Thirteenth 
East was cut off by enforcement of the covenant. (Tr. 
77-79.) The credibility of this witness and his ability 
to make such a conclusion, however, was all but de-
stroyed when he admitted on cross examination, "I am 
not familiar with the property." (Tr. 81.) 
This witness's conclusion is rendered ever further 
suspect in that it assumes enforcement of the covenant 
would deprive the leased premises of access to Thir-
teenth East. The leased premises is a parcel 152.5 ft. 
x 132.5 ft. Only the east 50 feet of the leased premises, 
which parallels Thirteenth East, is subject to the coven-
ant. A service station on the leased premises could have 
been constructed in such a way that it would be com-
patible with the covenant and yet blessed with direct ac-
cess to Thirteenth East. To accomplish this all the de-
fendants were required to do was make a single ac-
cess lane or set of lanes from Thirteenth East to both 
21 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
the parking and the service station. Additionally, access 
to the service station directly from Thirteenth East 
could have been provided at points north or south of 
the east 50 feet which is subject to the covenant. Defen-
dants presented no evidence regarding the availability, 
feasability or their attempts, if any, to provide such ac-
cess. Moreover, the defendants themselves admitted that 
the operation of a service station and a parking lot on 
the leased premises were not incompatible by providing 
in the lease rider (Exhibit 3-P) for merely a ratable re-
duction in rent in the event the covenant was enforced. 
Consequently, this witness's conclusion that enforce-
ment of the covenant would render the service sta-
tion valueless is itself valueless and unbelievable. By 
his own admission he was not at all familir with the 
property and his conclusion was based on the assump-
tion that enforcement of the covenant necessarily would 
deprive the station of access to Thirteenth East, an as-
sumption without a factual or evidentiary foundation. 
Consequently, the trial court, in its role as the finder 
of fact, was on sound ground in disregarding this tes-
timony. 
Even assuming that this testimony is credible, it 
does not establish injury to defendants. The equitable 
principle of "balancing of injury" requires proof of ir-
reparable injury and substantial hardship to defen-
dants resulting from the mandatory injunction. Evi-
dence that defendant will be deprived of substantial 
benefits if the injunction is granted, however, does not 
establish the required irreparable injury or substantial 
hardship. Fairrington v. Dyke Water Co., 50 Cal. 2d 
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198, 323 P. 2d 1001, 1002 (1958); 42 Am. Jur. 2d, In-
junctions § 56 at p. 800 (1969). The testimony referred 
to establishes only that the mandatory injunction would 
deprive the defendants of the monetary benefits derived 
from the operation of the service station. Deprivation 
of such benefits, however does not establish irreparable 
injury or substantial hardship under the "balance of in-
jury" test. Fairrington v. DyJce Water Co., supra; 42 
Am. Jur. 2d, Injunctions supra. Consequently, it was 
not established that the balance of injury favored the 
defendants and that under the circiunstances mandatory 
injunctive relief was thereby inappropriate. 
Again assuming the credibility of the testimony that 
enforcement of the covenant will render the service sta-
tion valueless, it does not establish irreparable injury to 
defendants. There was evidence that defendant Ameri-
can Oil made capital expenditures of $92,000. (Tr. 76, 
97.) Part of this total capital expenditure represented 
costs of equipment such as a prefabricated building, 
signs, pumps, canopies, tanks, telephone booth, light 
pole and other such improvements. Since improvements 
in this category can be used at another location, the 
cost of such improvements should be deducted from the 
total capital expenditure figure in calculating damages 
resulting from the lower court's injunction. Such costs 
could have been mathematically computed merely by 
reference to the books and records of defendant Ameri-
can Oil. The defendants, however, did not present evi-
dence on this matter. While it is obvious that the defen-
dants would incur costs in relocating their improve-
ments, defendants neglected to offer any evidence on 
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such costs even though these costs could be easily and 
objectively estimated. 
Thus, while there was evidence of the total expen-
diture by American Oil, there was an absolute void of 
evidence establishing the measurement of damage re-
sulting from the issuance of a mandatory injunction. 
Since such resultant damages, unlike the damage to 
plaintiffs, were peculiarly susceptible to objective cal-
culation and measurement, the defendants failed to es-
tablish irreparable injury and substantial hardship 
which they were required to do under the "balance of 
injury" test. Farrington v. Dyke Water Co., 50 Cal. 2d 
198, 323 P.2d 1001, 1002 (1958); Hiner v. Independent 
School District No. 50, 380 P. 2d 943, 946 (Okla. 1963); 
Pradelt v. Lewis, 297 111. 374, 130 N.E. 785, 14 ALR 
828, 831 (1921). Counsel for defendant American Oil 
admitted this failure of proof when he stated that no 
evidence had been presented upon which the trial court 
could render a judgment for damages to American Oil 
upon its cross claim against the other defendants pur-
suant to the indemnity agreement. (Tr. 116-117.) The 
defendants' failure to establish that the lower court's 
mandatory injunction would cause them irreparable 
damage precludes them from now contending that the 
injunction was improperly granted under the "balance 
of injury" test. Farrington v. Dyke Water Co., 50 Cal. 
2d 198, 323 P. 2d 1001,1002 (1958). 
In desperation the defendants contend that the "bal-
ance of injury" test favors the withholding of manda-
tory injunctive relief because the service station is a 
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benefit to the shopping center and to the public. This 
contention is totally irrelevant to any analysis involving 
relative hardship and injury to the litigating parties. 
It is a balatant attempt to inject the public interest when 
no such public interest is involved. "The interests in 
conflict in this case are . . . not those of the public and 
of an individual, but those of the two private owners 
who stand on equal ground as engaged in their own pri-
vate business." Quinn v. American Spiral Spring & 
Manufacturing Co., 293 Pa. 152, 141 A. 855, 61 ALR 918, 
923 (1928) (quoting from another case). 
To argue the public interest as a shield to their 
calculated and intentional violation of the covenant high-
lights the arrogance of the defendants. By so arguing 
defendants in effect claim that they hold a private au-
thority of eminent domain whereby they have the pow-
er to violate a lawful and unequivocal covenant because 
in their judgment the public interest would be better 
served by a service station on the subject property. 
Rather than establishing irreparable injury and hard-
ship, defendants contentions merely highlight the unique 
accessibility of the subject property which renders it 
equally beneficial to the public and the shopping center 
if used for parking as contemplated by the covenant. It 
is obvious that defendants have little concern for the 
public interest and the interests of the shopping center. 
Their respective interests are in reality to continue the 
lessor's income from the lease and to continue the lessee's 
income from the service station which had an above aver-
age sales record. (Tr. 76-77, 95-96). Such benefits to 
the defendant, however, do not establish irreparable in-
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jury or substantial hardship which defendants are re-
quired to prove under the "balance of injury" test. 
Fairrington v. Dyke Co., 50 Cal. 2d 198,323 P.2d 1001, 
1002 (1958); 42 Am. Jur. 2d, Injunctions § 56 at p. 800 
(1969). 
The evidentiary basis for the contention that the 
service station benefitted the shopping center was the 
conclusion of one witness. This witness was an employee 
of defendant American Oil and there was no evidence 
that he had any experience in shopping center develop-
ment. Furthermore, there was no evidence in the form 
of traffic statistics or dollar volumes in support of this 
conclusion. The basis for the conclusion was that the 
service station had a good freeway location. Such a bas-
is merely establishes the suitability of the subject prop-
erty for a myriad of uses, including parking, and again 
demonstrates that the defendants are not concerned with 
the interests of the shopping center but rather their own 
monetary interests. Consequently, it was within the dis-
cretion of the trial court as the finder of fact to dis-
regard this testimony. 
Even assuming that the instant case did not involve 
an intentional violation of the covenant and that the 
"balance of injury" test is therefore applicable, the evi-
dence establishes that mandatory injunctive relief was 
appropriate. Plaintiffs established irreparable and con-
tinuing injury resulting from the violation of the coven-
ant. Defendants, on the other hand, were unable to es-
tablish that mandatory injunctive relief would render 
the service station valueless and were unable to estab-
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lish the resultant quantum of damage when this mea-
surement was peculiarly susceptible to objective compu-
tation. All defendants were able to establish was that 
their pecuniary interests would be injured by mandatory 
injunctive enforcement. Such proof does not establish 
irreparable injury or substantial hardship which defen-
dants were required to prove under the "balance of in-
jury" test. Consequently, even under the "balance of 
injury" test, defendants did not establish that the alleged 
hardship resulting from mandatory injunctive enforce-
ment of the covenant outweighed the irreparable harm 
to the plaintiffs. Moreover, it is difficult to conceptual-
ize hardship sufficient to render mandatory injunctive 
relief inappropriate when the defendants actually con-
templated this very remedy prior to violating the cove-
nant in question. 
C. Plaintiffs Are Not Barred by Laches from 
Seeking Equitable Relief. 
Defendants contend that plaintiffs are estopped and 
barred from equitable relief because of laches. It is 
anomalous that defendants should now be relying on the 
equitable defense of laches. It was defendants' own in-
equitable conduct which caused this litigation. They 
knowingly and willfully violated the covenant, fully real-
izing the possible legal consequences, and then failed to 
notify plaintiffs of the contemplated violation. Defen-
dants now claim that plaintiffs should be barred from 
equitable relief because of their inexcusable delay. One 
who intentionally defies a known right, such as the de-
fendants in this case, is in no position to urge laches as 
a bar to mandatory injunctive relief. Stewart v. Finkel-
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stone, 206 Mass. 28, 92 N.E. 37, 39 (1910); see Avignone 
v, Roumel, 13 F. 2d 292, 295 (D.C. Cir. 1926); Smith v. 
Nelson, 149 Colo. 200, 368 P. 2d 566, 569 (1962); Baslego 
v. Kruleskie, 162 Pa. Super. 174, 56 A. 2d 377, 379 (1948). 
Even assuming that defendants can rely on the 
equitable defense of laches despite their own inequitable 
conduct, they have the burden of proof on this affirma-
tive defense and must establish the requisite prejudicial 
and inexcusable delay. E.g., Nadel v. Zeligson, 252 P.2d 
140, 144 (Okl. 1953); Ferron v. Rossi, 42 N.E. 2d 564, 
567 (Mass. 1942). In encroachment and similar cases, 
such as the one at bar, the evidence of laches should be 
clear and convincing. Arnold v. Melani, 75 Wash. 2d 143, 
449 P.2d 800, 803 (1968). The defendants in this case, 
however, have hopelessly failed to establish laches under 
any standard. 
The only evidence regarding plaintiffs' actual 
knowledge of the construction of the service station and 
the violation of the covenant was the testimony of Nick 
Papanikolas. Mr. Papanikolas testified that he first ob-
served the construction in August, 1970. (Tr. 107.) The 
trial court accordingly found that this was the first 
knowledge plaintiffs had of the construction. (Findings 
of Fact No. 15, E. 328.) Laches cannot be imputed to 
one in the position of the plaintiffs who is ignorant of 
the facts and consequently fails to assert his rights. 
Burningham v. Burke, 67 Utah 90, 245 P. 977, 983 
(1926); Openshaw v. Openshaw, 105 Utah 574, 144 P. 2d 
528, 531 (1943); Mary Jane Stevens Co. v. First National 
Building Co., 89 Utah 456, 57 P. 2d 1099, 1125 (1936). 
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The defendants at this time, however, not only had 
actual knowledge of the construction but also actual 
knowledge of the violation of the covenant. (Tr. 87-88, 
99-100; Exhibit 3-P; Findings of Fact Nos. 11, 12 and 
13, K, 200, 327-28.) When the defendant in a case such 
as this has actual knowledge of the violation of the cov-
enant and the plaintiff is ignorant of the violation, there 
is no estoppel and no laches,. Mary Jane Stevens Co. v. 
First National Building Co., 89 Utah 456, 57 P.2d 1099, 
1125 (1936); Finch v. Theiss, 267 111. 65, 107 N.E. 898, 
901-902 (1915); Bright v. Allen, 53 A. 251, 252 (Pa. 
1902). This Court succinctly stated this proposition in 
Mary Jcme Stevens: 
[T]here can be no estoppel when both parties are 
equally ignorant or in equal knowledge that one 
is on the other's ground, and certainly not when 
he who is encroached upon is ignorant and the 
other informed. . . Mere failure to object when 
the other must have equally known of the tres-
pass or both were ignorant does not raise an es-
toppel. 57 P. 2d at 1125. 
Moreover, under the circumstances, the law did not re-
quire the plaintiffs to investigate or attempt to deter-
mine whether the covenant was being violated. Mary 
Jane Stevens Co. v. First National Building Co., supra; 
Morgan v. Veach, 59 Cal App. 2d 682, 139 P.2d 976, 980 
(1943). 
Any failure by plaintiffs to assert their rights pri-
or to actual knowledge of the construction was caused 
by defendants' failure to notify them of the construction 
and the probable violation of the covenant. Since this 
failure to object was thereby caused and contributed to 
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by defendants themselves, they cannot rely on this fail-
ure as a basis for the defense of laches. Nadel v. Zelig-
son, 252 P. 2d 140, 145 (OH. 1952); Gaskill v. Neal, 77 
Idaho 428, 293 P. 2d 957, 959 (1956). In Walker v. Walk-
er, 17 Utah 2d 53, 404 P. 2d 253 (1965) this Court held 
that in order to rely on the delay of another in assert-
ing his rights, a party is required to take some affirm-
ative action. The Court stated: 
[T]he burden of taking some affirmative action 
should be upon him who accuses the other of de-
lay; and unless he has taken such action or in 
some manner put the other party on notice that 
action is required, he cannot take advantage of 
the delay. 404 P. 2d at 257 (emphasis added). 
The defendants, then, cannot rely on the failure of the 
plaintiffs to object to the construction prior to plain-
tiff's actual knowledge thereof because the defendants 
failed to notify plaintiffs of the construction and prob-
able violation of the covenant. Furthermore, under the 
case law analyzed above, the defendants have not es-
tablished the requisite elements of laches or estoppel 
since the plaintiffs were ignorant of the construction and 
violation of the covenant. Moreover, the plaintiffs were 
not required to investigate or attempt to determine 
whether a violation had occurred and defendants can-
not rely on the failure of plaintiffs to object to the con-
struction since defendants themselves failed to comply 
with their duty to notify the plaintiffs. 
Notwithstanding defendants' failure to notify the 
plaintiffs, they now contend that a sign placed on the 
leased premises announcing to the public the construc-
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tion of the service station constituted constructive notice 
to the plaintiffs of the violation of the covenant. The 
evidence does not establish that this sign could have 
reasonably conveyed notice of the violation of the cov-
enant. The sign was placed somewhere on the leased 
premises in February or March 1970. (Tr. 91-92.) 
There was no evidence that this sign was placed on that 
portion of the leased premises which was subject to the 
convenant. The sign wras small, approximately 3 ft. x 
5 ft. or 4 ft. x 6 ft. 
Other than the testimony that the sign generally 
announced the construction of the service station (Tr. 
91), there is no evidence of the contents of the sign. 
There is certainly no evidence that the sign reasonably 
conveyed notice that the covenant would be violated. 
There was no evidence as to where on the leased prem-
ises the station would be located. Consequently, any law 
abiding citizen with knowledge of the covenant would, 
upon viewing the sign, assume that defendants would 
comply with the covenant. Since a parcel 152.5 ft x 82.5 
ft., which was a substantial portion of the leased prem-
ises, was not subject to the covenant, this would be a 
reasonable assumption. Furthermore, the station could 
have been easily constructed and operated in a manner 
compatible with the covenant by the construction of a 
single access lane or set of lanes which would benefici-
ally serve both a service station on the west 82.5 feet 
and a parking lot on the east 50 feet of the leased prem-
ises. Moreover, since defendants were engaged in land 
fill at the north end of the property, it would also be 
reasonable to assume that defendants would provide ac-
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cess to the station at points north and south of the prop-
erty subject to the covenants. 
There was no evidence regarding either the activi-
ties involved with the construction of the station or the 
time when the various stages of construction occurred 
prior to August, 1970 when Mr. Papanikolas observed 
the prefabricated building. Consequently, there is no 
evidence that either the sign or the construction could 
reasonably convey notice of the violation of the coven-
ant for parking on the east 50 feet of the 152.5 ft. x 132.5 
ft. leased premises. Thus, defendants presented no evi-
dence upon which to base their contention of construc-
tive notice. Even if defendants had met their burden of 
proof on this issue, it would have been to no avail since 
one who has knowledge of an invasion of another's rights 
cannot rely on laches or estoppel when the other party 
is ignorant of the invasion. Mary Jane Stevens Co. v. 
First National Building Co., 89 Utah 456, 47 P. 2d 1099, 
1125 (1936); Finch v. Tlieiss, 267 111. 65, 107 N.E. 898, 
901-902 (1915). Certainly the placing of a sign on the 
leased premises announcing to the public the construc-
tion of the station cannot satisfy defendantsJ affirmative 
duty to give actual notification of the violation of the 
covenant to the plaintiffs. Walker v. Walker, 17 Utah 
2d 53, 404 P.2d 253, 257 (1965). 
Immediately after Mr. Papanikolas observed the 
prefabricated building, he contacted defendants regard-
ing the possible violation of the covenant. (Tr. 107-108; 
Findings of Fact No. 16, R. 328-29.) There immediately 
followed an exchange of correspondence between plain-
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tiffs' counsel, defendant Sugarhouse Shopping Center 
Associates and said defendant's counsel. In this corres-
pondence, plaintiffs' counsel protested the violation of 
the covenant. (Tr. 50-51; Exhibits 5-P, 6-P and 7-P; 
Findings of Fact No. 17, E. 329.) The defendants re-
fused to comply with plaintiffs' demands and completed 
construction of the service station in August, 1970. It 
is obvious from these facts that plaintiffs, upon acquir-
ing actual knowledge of the violation, did everything the 
law required by making an immediate protest to defend-
ants. E.g., Hartman v. Wells, 257 111. 167, 100 N.E. 500, 
501 (1912); Morgan v. Veach, 59 €al. App. 2d 682,139 P. 
2d 976,980 (1943). .,
 T . . hi : ^ -
Between the date of the last letter of plaintiffs' 
counsel, September 1, 1970, and the filing of this law-
suit on March 6,1972, the parties periodically negotiated 
the sale of plaintiffs' property in connection with the 
settlement of the violation of the covenant. (Tr. 52,114; 
Findings of Fact No. 18, R. 329.) When it became ob-
vious to the plaintiffs that these negotiations would not 
be further productive or fruitful, they immediately filed 
this lawsuit. (Tr. 52.) Certainly no negative inferences 
can be drawn from the delay caused by attempts to set-
tie this dispute. Plaintiffs should not be required to in-
cur substantial legal fees and file a lawsuit during ne-
gotiations for the sale of their property which, if suc-
cessful, would have terminated their interest in preserv-
ing the subject property for parking. Defendants now 
contend that plaintiffs' delay during this period and 
their failure to immediately file the lawsuit constituted 
laches. There can be no laches, however, when plaintiffs' 
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delay in filing the lawsuit is caused or contributed to by 
the def endats. Gaskill v. Neal, 77 Idaho 428, 293 P.2d 957, 
959 (1956); Nadel v. Zeligson, 252 P.2d 140, 145 (Okl. 
1953). When the delay in filing a lawsuit is caused by 
an effort to settle a dispute, the doctrine of laches can-
not be invoked by either party. Reading v. Keller, 67 
Wash. 2d 86, 406 P. 2d 634, 637 (1965); GasJcill v. Neal, 
supra. Consequently, plaintiffs cannot now rely on the 
delay caused by the negotiations as the basis for their 
contention of laches. 
<•'' The defendants proceeded to complete the construc-
tion of the service station around the time Mr. Papanik-
olas voiced his protest. Thus, an earlier filing of this 
lawsuit would not have prevented the construction of 
the station and violation of the covenant. Defendants 
were, therefore, not prejudiced by any alleged delay in 
filing the lawsuit. To establish laches or estoppel defen-
dants were required to establish prejudice and injury re-
sulting from any alleged delay by plaintiffs and mere 
proof of the delay, by itself, is insufficient. Mary Jane 
Stevens Co. v. First National Building Co., 89 Utah 456, 
57 P. 2d 1099, 1125 (1936); Matvhinney v. Jensen, 120 
Utah 142, 232 P. 2d 769, 773 (1951); Openshaw v. Open-
shaw, 105 Utah 574, 144 P. 2d 528, 531 (1943); Burning-
%am v. Burke, 67 Utah 90, 245 P. 977, 983 (1926). In en-
croachment cases and ones similar to the instant case, 
there is no necessity for early enforcement of demands 
through legal processes when the plaintiff does not have 
actual knowledge of defendant's wrongdoing until the 
improvements have been substantially completed. Stew-
art v. Finkelstone, 206 Mass. 28, 92 N.E. 37, 39 (1910) ; 
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Quinn v. American Spiral Spring & Manufacturing Co., 
293 Pa. 152, 141 A. 855, 61 ALR 918, 923, (1928). Since 
mere delay in filing a lawsuit, by itself, without any ac-
companying prejudice does not establish laches, defen-
dants' contentions are without merit. 
The defendants in the instant case have failed to 
meet their burden of proof to establish laches. Plain-
tiffs had no actual knowledge of the construction or vio-
lation of the covenant until the service station was sub-
stantially completed. Additionally, there was no evi-
dence to establish constructive knowledge. Defendants 
themselves failed to fulfill their' obligation to notify the 
plaintiffs who were ignorant of the construction. Since 
plaintiffs immediately objected to defendants upon ac-
quiring actual knowledge and since the subsequent dela> 
in filing a complaint was the result of an attempt to set-
tle the dispute, no basis for asserting laches exists in 
this case. Moreover, defendants should not even be 
allowed to rely on the equitable! defense of laches since 
they knowingly and intentionally defied the rights of the 
plaintiffs. 
D. The Covenant Was Reasonable at the Time 
of Its Creation and Continues to be Reason-
able. 
Plaintiffs agree with defendants' statement of the 
law at page 22 of their brief regarding the reasonable-
ness of and purposes underlying covenants similar to 
the one in question: "Restrictive covenants are enforce-
able only so long as they are reasonable and their en-
forcement relates to the purposes for which the coven-
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ant was created." In order to successfully challenge the 
covenant, defendants must establish by clear and con-
vincing evidence that the covenant is unreasonable and 
that the purpose for which it was created no longer 
exists. Metropolitan Investment Co. v. Sine, 14 Utah 2d 
36, 376 P. 2d 940, 943 (1962). The evidence, however, 
conclusively establishes that the covenant was reason-
able at the time it was created, continues to be so and 
that the purposes for which it was created are still in 
existence. 
The plaintiffs presently are owners of properties 
in the Sugarhouse Shopping Center and surrounding 
area, including unimproved property close to the service 
station. (Tr. 72.) In order to ultimately assure the full 
commercial development of the Sugarhouse Shopping 
Center and surrounding areas, plaintiffs entered into 
mutual covenants for parking with defendant Sugar-
house Shopping Center Associates' predecessor in inter-
est. They sought to accomplish this purpose by coven-
ants which would insure the continuing availability of 
adequate parking and which specifically designated par-
ticular parcels for parking. (Ex. 1-P.) 
The same needs, interests and purposes which com-
pelled plaintiffs to enter into these mutual covenants in 
1954 still exist today. The trial court recognized this 
when, after viewing all of the evidence, it found that at 
the time of trial the character of the shopping center 
was substantially the same as it was in 1954. (Findings 
of Fact No. 21, E, 201.) This Court has stated that when 
the character of an area surrounding the property sub-
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ject to the restrictive covenants remains unchanged, the 
conclusion that the original purposes of the restrictions 
still exist is inescapable. Metropolitan Investment Co. v. 
Sine, 14 Utah 2d 36,376 P.2d 940, 944-45 (1962). Since the 
character of the shopping center was found to be sub-
stantially the same as it was in 1954, the conclusion is 
inescapable that the original purposes for the covenant 
still exist. 
There is an abundance of evidence, which defen-
dants refuse to acknowledge, establishing that the avail-
ability of parking is presently inadequate and will be 
further inadequate in the near future. Certain proper-
ty, which defendants contend is presently available for 
parking, is of no particular value for parking because 
of the adverse contour of the land. (Tr. 109.) There 
was also testimony that certain areas north of the shop-
ping center, which are presently used for parking, may 
not be available for parking in the future because the 
owner of the easement between these areas and the 
shopping center was contesting access across its ease-
ment to the shopping center. (Tr. 101-104.) Further-
more, plain tiffs' development of the presently unim-
proved property close to the service station will create 
additional demand for parking. (Tr. 72.) Moreover, 
plaintiffs own several residental properties directly 
south of the shopping center which they plan to develop 
as shopping center property and which in turn will fur-
ther increase the demand for parking. (Tr. 104-106.) 
Thus, the original purposes of the covenant, i.e., to fully 
develop the shopping center and surrounding area and 
to provide adequate parking for such development by 
37 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
designating certain parcels specifically for parking, still 
exist. 
It is also significant that the covenant and its pur-
poses are not incompatible with the operation of a ser-
vice station on the property leased to defendant Amer-
ican Oil. Defendants could have constructed the service 
station in such a way that a single access lane or set of 
lanes would serve both a parking area and the service 
station. Additionally, defendants could have provided ac-
cess to the station north and south of the property sub-
ject to the covenant. If defendants had constructed the 
service station in this manner, multiple uses could have 
been made of this property which is peculiarly suitable 
for such multiple use because of the ease of access to 
Thirteenth East and the freeway. 
Defendants make numerous desperate attempts to 
construe the record to their liking. They contend that 
the record establishes that no one, including the plain-
tiffs, had ever made demand for additional parking. 
(Appellants brief pp. 6, 25.) What the record really re-
veals is that one witness, who was a mere employee of 
a defendant, testified that no demand had ever been 
made on him for additional parking. The trial court, in 
overruling an objection by plain tiffs' counsel, recognized 
the limited value of this testimony and stated: 
i Well, he is just responding to a question wheth-
er he knows if a demand has been made and his 
answer is, "No." I am sure the Court under-
stands there are circumstances where a demand 
might have been made that he didn't know about. 
(Tr. 74-75.) .> 
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The record unequivocally demonstrates that demand for 
aditional parking had in fact been made on numerous 
occasions by defendants themselves. Defendant Sugar-
house Shopping Center Associates and its general part-
ners filed a counterclaim against the plaintiffs alleging 
that plaintiffs themselves had violated the covenant for 
parking. In support of this counterclaim these defen-
dants alleged that they had made numerous demands 
on plaintiffs to construct additional parking facilities 
on plaintiffs' property and that plain tiffs' failure to 
comply with these demands constituted a violation of 
the covenants. (Answer to Plaintiffs' Amended Com-
plaint, E. 125; More Definitely Stated Counterclaim, B. 
156.) Defendants' further contention that there has nev-
er been a shortage of parking in the area is totally un-
supported by the record. (Appellants' brief pp. 6, 25.) 
A question on this matter was propounded to a witness, 
objected to and never answered. (Tr. 73-74.) 
The record clearly establishes the reasonableness 
of the covenant for parking and the countinuing exist-
ence of the original purposes for which the covenant 
was created. The same needs, interests and purposes 
which compelled plaintiffs to enter into the mutual cov-
enants in 1954 still exist today. This conclusion is ines-
capable since the character of the shopping center was 
substantially the same at the time of trial as it was in 
1954. Additionally, there is an abundance of evidence 
establishing that the availability of parking is presently 
inadequate and will be further inadequate in the near 
future. Furthermore, the covenant did not unreasonably 
restrict the leased premises since it was suitable for and 
39 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
compatible with multiple uses, including parking and the 
operation of a service station. 
E. The March 1954 Agreement is Unambiguous. 
Notwithstanding defendants contentions that re-
strictive covenants are not favored in the law, such cov-
enants do exist, are lawful and are enforced by this 
Court even when challenged as being fatally ambiguous. 
E.g., Freeman v. Gee, 18 Utah 2d 339, 423 P. 2d 155 
(1967): Schick v. Perry, 12 Utah 2d 173, 364 P. 2d 116 
(1961); Metropolitan Investment Co. v. Sine, 14 Utah 2d 
36, 376 P. 2d 940 (1962). , ,
 4 .,, 
Defendants' contention that the 1954 agreement is 
ambiguous is anomalous in light of the reference to this 
agreement in the lease rider executed by these defen-
dants. Paragraph 19 of the lease rider first expressly 
acknowledges the agreement and defendants' awareness 
of it and then states that this agreement provides that 
the subject property "shall be set aside as a parking 
area." Additionally, defendants filed a counterclaim 
against plaintiffs based on the very agreement which 
they now claim is ambiguous and in which they admit 
that the 1954 agreement, as a whole, is concerned with 
the availability and adequacy of parking facilities. (More 
Definitely Stated Counterclaim, R. 155-56.) Con-
sequently, the defendants by their own conduct, state-
ments and pleadings concede and admit that the 1954 
agreement is unequivocal in restricting the subject par-
cel for parking only, that the agreement as a whole is 
concerned with the availability and adequacy of park-
ing and that the operation of a service station on the 
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subject parcel is clearly violative of the unambiguous 
agreement. 
The 1954 agreement on its face is clear and unam-
biguous. Paragraphs I and I I of this agreement recite 
the properties in the area owned by the respective 
parties. Paragraph I I I sets forth the mutual covenants 
in five separate subparagraphs numbered 1-5 (Ex. 1-P.) 
Paragraph I I I sets out a prefatory provision for all of 
the subparagraphs. This prefatory provision states: 
WHEBEAS, the Company and the Partnership 
are devolping a shopping center in the area, 
covered by the above described lands and desire 
to designate and set aside portions of the above 
described land to be used for automobile parking. 
(Ex. 1-P) (emphasis added). 
Certainly the parties could not have more clearly artic-
ulated the proposition that the restrictions recited there-
after were for the purpose of designating certain por-
tions of the property for automobile parking only. 
The subparagraphs 1-5 follow this clear recitation 
of the parties * purposes. Subparagraph 1 contains the 
restriction in question and, after reciting the particular 
portions of the property subject thereto, states that these 
parcels "shall be parking areas for motor vehicles." 
The remaining subparagraphs again make reference to 
"parking areas." All of these subparagraphs are consis-
tent with each other and consistent with the general in-
tent and purpose expressed in the prefatory provision 
that the agreement was concerned with property "to be 
used for automobile parking" No more clear expression 
of intent and purpose could have been made. Defen-
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dants have lifted a single phrase from a five page agree-
ment in an attempt to support their contention that the 
agreement is ambiguous and that their operation of a 
service station is consistent with the covenant. Even if 
the phrase so lifted is arguably ambiguous the applica-
tion of the ejudem generis rule of construction renders 
it unambiguous. See, Freeman v. Gee, 18 Utah 2d 339, 
423 P.2d 155, 159 (1967); Schick v. Perry, 12 Utah 2d 
173, 364 P.2d 116 (1961). 
Defendants' final basis for arguing an ambiguity in 
the 1954 agreement rests on the proposition that the 
mere existence of subsequent unrecorded agreements, 
which were never offered or received in evidnee, illus-
trate the ambiguity of the earlier agreement. In this re-
gard defendants attempt to raise negative inferences 
from plaintiffs' failure to offer as evidence the subse-
quent instruments. Certainly defendants cannot ques-
tion plaintiffs' right to conduct their own ease in chief 
and must respect the decision of the plaintiffs to rely 
solely on the 1954 agreement. 
The only concern which defendants expressed at 
trial about plaintiffs' desire not to rely on the subse-
quent instruments is diametrically opposed to their pres-
ent contention. At trial defendants expressed the con-
cern that plaintiffs would seek to show that the 1954 
agreement was modified by the subsequent instruments 
which even more strictly restricted the property in ques-
tion. Now, however, defendants contend that the subse-
quent agreements did modify the 1954 agreement and 
thereby rendered it ambiguous. Defendants were plan-
ning to rely on their lack of notice of the subsequent in-
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struments in support of their cross claim against cer-
tain of the other defendants who were the former own-
ers of the property. When plaintiffs' counsel stipulated 
that he did not intend to claim a more strict covenant 
as a result of subsequent modifications of the 1954 agree-
ment, defendants concurred in plaintiffs' decision to re-
ly solely on the 1954 agreement and the cross-defendants 
were dismissed by stipulation. (Tr. 25-33.) Consequent-
ly, not only did defendants fail to properly object to 
plaintiffs' decision to rely solely on the 1954 agreement 
but they actually concurred in and stipulated to it. 
Defendants now contend that plaintiffs' decision to 
rely solely on the 1954 agreement "deprived defendants 
of their opportunity to show the ambiguity in the agree-
ment." (Appellants brief p. 28.) It is difficult to under-
stand an argument like this which claims that plaintiffs 
in conducting their case in chief deprived defendants of 
their right to properly defend the case by not offering 
as evidence certain instruments which all parties had 
copies of and knew about. If defendants were legitimate-
ly concerned with plaintiffs' decision not to rely on and 
offer as evidence certain instruments, the most logical 
thing for the defendants to do would be to offer the sub-
sequent instruments themselves. This they failed to do 
and thereby waived any right to subsequently object to 
the fact that these instruments were not offered or re-
ceived into evidence. 
The 1954 agreement was unequivocal, clear and un-
ambiguous. The defendants' own statements, conduct 
and pleadings admit and concede this. The 1954 agree-
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ment on its face is clear and unambiguous. Additional-
ly, defendants waived any right which they even argu-
ably had to object to plaintiffs' reliance solely on the 
1954 agreement and waived any similar right to now 
contend that subsequent instruments reflect the ambi-
guity of the 1954 agreement, ,\ 
F. The Trial Court's Findings of Fact Are Based 
on Sufficient Evidence and Are Not Clearly 
Erroneous 
The trial court's Findings of Fact in the instant 
case, which were made pursuant to its equity powers and 
support the Conclusions of Law and judgment, are based 
on sufficient evidence in the record and are not clearly 
erroneous. Consequently, this Court will not disturb 
these findings on appeal. Nunley v. Walker, 13 Utah 2d 
105, 369 P. 117,122 (1962); Mayer v. Flynm, 46 Utah 598, 
150 P. 962, 964 (1915). Even if the record evidence 
could equally support findings in favor of defendant, 
this Court will respect and uphold the findings below 
since the trial court had the peculiar advantage of hear-
ing the testimony and seeing the witnesses. In a case 
such as the one at bar where knowledge and intent of 
the parties bear so heavily on all of the issues, these 
principles are particularly applicable. Mayer v. Flyrm, 
supra. Consequently, since the record fully supports the 
trial court's findings, this Court can affirm the judg-
ment below on factual grounds. 
POINT II 
THE TKIAL COUKT PROPERLY DENIED 
DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS FOR 
FAILURE TO JOIN AN INDISPENSABLE 
PARTY. 
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After having attempted to legitimize a calculated 
and intentional violation of the covenant for parking, 
defendants make a final contention to this Court that 
plaintiffs' complaint should have been dismissed for 
failure to name an indispensable party. The determina-
tion of indispensability is bottomed on equitable con-
siderations. E.g., Toney v. White, 476 F. 2d 203, 207 
modified on other grounds 488 F. 2d 310 (5th Cir. 1973). 
A consideration of all the facts and circumstances and 
the application thereto of equitable principles compels 
a determination by this Court that defendant American 
Oil's sublessee is not an indispensable party. 
The determination of the issue of indispensability 
is not a matter of law but rather a pragmatic considera-
tion based on the weighing of the facts, circumstances 
and relative equities. Rippey v. Denver United States 
National Bank, 260 F. Supp. 704, 717 (D. Colo. 1966) ; 
Imperial Appliance Corp. v. Hamilton Manufacturing 
Co., 263 F. Supp. 1015, 1017 (E.D. Wis. 1967). The 
curious element in defendants' contention of indispens-
ability in the absence of facts. After over two years of 
discovery in this case, counsel for defendants moved 
for dismissal of the complaint for failure to join an 
indispensable party. According to the representations 
of counsel, the alleged indispensable party was one 
Peter E. Murdock who allegedly subleased the service 
station from defendant American Oil after the commence-
ment of this lawsuit. (Tr. 5.) Counsel for defendants 
represented to the trial court that they were unaware of 
this sublease until the Friday preceding the Monday 
trial date. (Tr. 5.) 
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Counsel for defendants made no attempt to formal-
ize these representations by means of sworn affidavits 
or testimony from Mr. Murdock himself or representa-
tives from American Oil, the latter being present in 
court for the purpose of testifying on other issues. More-
over, counsel for defendants did not even offer a veri-
fication of these representations in the form of a copy 
of the sublease. Since the date of the sublease is un-
certain, it can only be estimated that defendants had 
between one and two years to bring this matter to the 
attention of the court. Defendants' counsel had more 
than three days to notify the plaintiffs' counsel of this 
matter but failed to do so. Defendants now ask this 
Court to reverse the mandatory injunction of the lower 
court, which was issued after a full trial on the merits, 
without having even made an offer of proof on the 
following matters: (a) whether the sublease was oral 
or written; (b) if the latter, whether the sublease was 
recorded; (c) the length or duration of the sublease; 
(d) the conditions of termination; (e) disclaimer of im-
plied warranties; (f) the existence of any express war-
ranties; (g) indemnification provisions similar to those 
in the lease rider (Ex. 3-P) between the defendants. The 
trial court could not grant the motion or require joinder 
and this Court should not consider defendants' appellate 
contentions on this matter when the defendants them-
selves have made absolutely no effort to present or even 
offer a factual or evidentiary basis in support. 
Defendant American Oil allegedly entered into the 
sublease which it now asserts as a defense after this 
case was commenced by the plaintiffs. Nevertheless, 
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defendant American Oil did not bring this to the atten-
tion of its own counsel until three to four days prior 
to trial. No reason is given for its failure to realize 
the alleged significance of the sublease for two years 
and then suddenly, three days before trial, determine 
that it is significant enough to bring to the attention of 
counsel for defendants. Defendants, then, allowed two 
years to lapse without amending their pleadings to in-
corporate the alleged sublease. To allow the defendants to 
now rely on the sublease allegedly created after the com-
mencement of this action as a basis for reversal of the 
lower court would be unconscionable The Court should 
not allow the defendants to have the power to confer indis-
pensability upon another at any time during litigation. 
Defendants contend that the sublessee's alleged con-
trol and possession of the premises required his joinder. 
One is not an indispensable party, however, merely be-
cause he has a substantial interest in the subject matter 
of the litigation. Lubin v. Chicago Title & Trust Co., 
260 F. 2d 411 (7th Cir. 1958); Ford v. Adkins, 39 F. Supp. 
472, 473 (E.D. 111. 1941). Defendants then contend that 
the sublessee is an indispensable party because the lower 
court's injunction may require defendant American Oil 
to violate the sublease even though it allegedly has no 
possessory rights to the leased premises. Defendants 
cannot make such a contention when there is no evidence 
to elucidate the provisions of the alleged sublease which 
delineate the conduct constituting a violation of the sub-
lease. Moreover, contrary to the contentions of defend-
ants, defendant American Oil does have certain posses-
sory rights as a matter of law, including the right to exe-
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cute an order of a court directing it "to do any a c t . . . on 
the land." Restatement (Second) of Torts § 210 (1965). 
Defendants' finally contend on behalf of the sub-
lessee that his rights wall be unnecessarily prejudiced 
if it is determined that he is not an indispensable party. 
It is difficult to find any prejudice to the alleged sub-
lessee when he was on constructive notice of the cove-
nants in the recorded 1954 agreement. If the alleged 
lessee suffered any prejudice, it was the result of any 
one or all of the following events: (a) his failure to 
conduct a title search which would have revealed the 
existence of the covenants; (b) the intentional failure 
of the defendants to record the lease rider (Ex. 3-P), 
which acknowledged the existence and consequence of 
the covenants; or (c) the defendants intentional failure 
to otherwise affirmatively notify the sublessee of the 
covenants. 
It is also significant that the alleged sublessee's 
interests in defending against plaintiffs' lawsuit were 
identical to the interests of defendant American Oil. 
Consequently, his interests were fully represented and 
he suffered no prejudice. See Toney v. White, 476 F. 
2d 203, 207, modified on other grounds 488 F. 2d 310 (5th 
Cir. 1973). Additionally, the alleged sublessee will have 
an action for damages if the enforcement of the covenant 
causes defendant American Oil to breach its sublease. 
Cf. Ford v. Adkins, 39 F. Supp. 472, 474 (E.D. 111. 1941). 
Certainly, it is no more harsh to require the alleged sub-
lessee to litigate such a claim than it would have been 
to require him to be joined and defend this action by 
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the plaintiffs. Any judgment in such an action would be 
wholly consistent with the lower court's mandatory in-
junction in the case at bar. 
Considering all of the circumstances, it would be 
a miscarriage of justice and a misapplication of applic-
able equitable principles to hold that the alleged sub-
lessee is an indispensable party. Defendants have neither 
presented nor offered any factual or evidentiary basis 
for such a holding. Moreover, this Court should not af-
ford these defendants the power to confer indispens-
ability upon any third party. The lower court's judg-
ment can be lawfully executed notwithstanding the ab-
sence of any alleged sublessee. The judgment itself does 
not prejudice the alleged sublessee's cause of action 
based on a claimed violation of a sublease and the manda-
tory injunction is fully consistent with any subsequent 
judgment for damages in favor of the alleged sublessee. 
Consequently, the alleged sublessee is not an indispens-
able party in the case at bar. 
CONCLUSION 
The circumstances of this case render the trial 
court's mandatory injunctive relief particularly appro-
priate. Because of defendants' calculated and intentional 
violation of the covenant, the equitable principle of "bal-
ancing of injury" is inapposite. Even assuming the ap-
plicability of this principle, the balance of injury sub-
stantially favors the injunctive relief granted. Neither 
the facts nor the law can support defendants' defenses 
of laches, unreasonableness of the covenant, ambiguity 
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in the 1954 agreement or absence of an indispensable 
party. Consequently, the judgment of the trial court 
should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK 
& MCDONOUGH 
Edward J. McDonough, Esq. 
Michael R. Murphy, Esq. 
800 Walker Bank Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Respondents 
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